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Comment
Nieto v. Ecker: Incorporation of Nonfiduciary
Liability Under ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")' safeguards the financial integrity of employee ben-
efit plans.2 ERISA imposes strict standards on plan fiduciaries3
to ensure that benefits are available when entitled participants
need them.4 ERISA also provides "appropriate remedies, sanc-
tions, and ready access to the Federal courts" to prevent and
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987) and scattered sections of the Internal Rev-
enue Code at 26 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1987)).
2. ERISA defines employee benefit plan or plan as an "employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an
employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." ERISA
§ 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982). An employee benefit plan may sue or be
sued as an entity under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. Id, § 502(d)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1). ERISA covers only private employee benefit plans and
explicitly excludes "governmental plan[s]." I& § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b).
A governmental plan is any plan established or maintained by the government
of the United States, any state, or any political subdivision for the benefit of
public employees. Id. § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32).
The increasing financial magnitude of private employee benefit plans in
the United States indicates their importance. In 1975, 44.5 million employees
participated in 340,000 retirement plans having a total value of $543 billion. In
1983, 67 million employees participated in 775,000 plans. The total amount of
assets invested in these plans was $900 billion. One expert estimates that
workers in the United States will have three trillion dollars invested in pen-
sion plans by 1995. See Lilly, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
35 LAB. L.J. 603, 604 (1984).
3. Section 3(21)(A) defines a fiduciary with respect to a plan covered by
ERISA:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respect-
ing management of such plan or exercises any authority or control re-
specting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan.
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982).
4. Plan fiduciaries must adhere to the standard of care established under
ERISA section 404(a), which provides in relevant part:
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remedy plan abuse.5 ERISA's language does not expressly re-
fer to nonfiduciaries or their potential liability for assisting fi-
duciary breaches of duty. Nonfiduciaries, however, often
participate and profit from a plan fiduciary's breach of duty
under ERISA.6 Accordingly, many courts have protected plan
funds and beneficiaries by incorporating the traditional trust
principle of nonfiduciary liability into ERISA's remedial
provisions.7
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the cir-
cumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to mini-
mize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is
clearly prudent not to do so ....
Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
5. Id. § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). ERISA protects "the interests of par-
ticipants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries... by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready
access to the Federal courts." Id
6. See, e.g., Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1988) (alleging that
nonfiduciary unjustly profited from plan fiduciary's cover-up of unwarranted
legal fees paid from plan resources).
7. See Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding li-
able under ERISA § 409(a) nonfiduciary assistant who received direct profit,
along with fiduciary union representative, by soliciting plan business for group
of dentists); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, 829 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding nonfiduciary corporations liable along with plan trustee
under ERISA § 409(a) for acting in concert to cause prohibited investments of
plan assets); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding
plan attorney and attorney's law firm liable under ERISA § 409(a) for dam-
ages caused to plan by conspiracy to defraud plan of millions of dollars
through insurance scam); Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563, 569 (D.N.J. 1986)
(finding that third-party service providers, although not fiduciaries or parties
in interest under ERISA, were potentially liable to dental plan for knowingly
receiving excessive fees for services rendered); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F.
Supp. 390, 410-11 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (holding attorney liable under ERISA
§ 409(a) for knowingly participating in decision of trustees to allow themselves
to participate in plan and to extend coverage to attorney and pay him benefits
from the plan); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 641-42
(W.D. Wis. 1979) (imposing liability under ERISA § 409(a) on nonfiduciary
sellers in loan transactions for aiding trustees in causing all of plan's assets to
be loaned back to sponsoring company in exchange for unsecured promissory
notes); see also Fink v. National Sav. & Trust, 772 F.2d 951, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(dicta) (approving nonfiduciary liability under ERISA); Fremont v. McGraw-
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The Ninth Circuit, in Nieto v. Ecker,8 held that a nonfidu-
ciary who participates in a plan fiduciary's breach of trust is not
liable for damages under any ERISA provision.9 In Nieto, an
attorney caused the dismissal of suits to recover mandatory
plan contributions from delinquent employers by failing to try
them within five years of filing the complaints in state court.'L
The attorney continued to charge the plan legal fees for serv-
ices associated with the suits even after their dismissal.:" Plan
trustees discovered this fraud and struck a "sweetheart" deal' 2
with the attorney.' 3 The arrangement between the trustees
and the attorney involved repayment of no more than one-
fourth of the plan funds lost in contributions and unearned
fees.14 Although the attorney conspired with the plan's trust-
ees to misappropriate funds, the Ninth Circuit found that no
claim for damages existed against the nonfiduciary attorney
Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752, 759 (7th Cir. 1979) (recognizing third persons who
conspire with trustee in breach of fiduciary duty may be liable under ERISA
in ordinary civil action against trustee but concluding it would be improper to
deprive nonfiduciary employee of vested pension rights even though he prof-
ited from participation in trustee's breach), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980);
Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1167-68 (D.D.C. 1986)
(holding ERISA § 502(a)(3) equivalent to § 409(a) action against nonfiduciaries
who participate in breach of trust by fiduciaries).
8. 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988).
9. 1d. at 873; see infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
10. Brief for Appellant at 7, Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988)
(No. 87-5598) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief]. Although the defend-
ant filed lawsuits in state court to collect delinquent contributions from em-
ployers, his failure to bring them to trial within five years as state procedures
required resulted in their dismissal. Id. Plan participants alleged that dismis-
sal of these claims cost the plan funds some $300,000. Id.
11. Fees charged by the defendant in connection with these dismissed
cases, including the period of concealment after dismissal, cost the plan ap-
proximately $250,000. Id.
12. "Sweetheart" deals are exchanges for personal favors or are related to
conflicts of interests. Soffer, Collective Bargaining and Federal Regulation of
Government, in REGULATING UNION GOVERNMENT 107 (M. Estey, P. Taft & M.
Wagner eds. 1964). In the labor union context, "sweetheart" contracts sacrifice
the interests of the employees to advance those of union leadership. J.
GETMALN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONs: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND
PRACTICE 307 (1988). When plan fiduciaries engage in "sweetheart" deals, the
interests of plan participants are subordinated to the interests of the fiducia-
ries or third parties. Under ERISA, a "sweetheart" deal violates the fiduci-
ary's duties to act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.
See infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing extent of fiduciary duty
under ERISA).
13. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 10, at 8; see infra notes 101-03
and accompanying text.
14. Id
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under ERISA.15
This Comment examines whether ERISA permits recovery
against a nonfiduciary who knowingly participates in a plan fi-
duciary's breach of duty. Part I discusses the common-law trust
principles underlying ERISA's fiduciary standard and sets forth
ERISA's operative remedial provisions. Part I also examines
judicial interpretations of ERISA remedies prior to Nieto, in-
cluding limitations the United States Supreme Court has im-
posed on the type of damages recoverable and recourse against
nonfiduciaries, in light of the congressional intent and policies
supporting ERISA. Part II analyzes the Ninth Circuit's holding
in Nieto v. Ecker and argues that rejection of nonfiduciary lia-
bility under ERISA is inconsistent with the remedial purposes
of the Act. The Comment concludes that federal courts should
incorporate into ERISA a nonfiduciary liability standard for
knowing participation in a fiduciary's breach of trust to provide
employee benefit plans uniform and comprehensive relief.
I. ERISA AND THE COMMON LAW OF TRUSTS
A. DEVELOPMENT OF ERISA
Before ERISA, trustee abuse and corruption through self-
dealing,16 imprudent investments, and misappropriations of em-
ployee benefit plan funds prevented many participants from re-
ceiving their benefitsY1 Federal tax regulations punished
15. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873; see infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text
(discussing court's holding).
16. Self-dealing occurs when fiduciaries deal with themselves as individu-
als in a transaction. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 543
(1949). At common law, a trustee violated the duty of loyalty by acting on
both sides of a transaction. Id. ERISA also recognizes that a fiduciary can vio-
late the duty of loyalty in dealings with third persons. See infra notes 54, 153
and accompanying text (describing ERISA's proscription against self-dealing).
17. 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams, Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, upon introducing the
Conference Report on H.R. 2) (noting that existing state and federal law has
failed to prevent employee benefit plan abuse), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5117, 5186.
Congress intended ERISA to ensure that participants in employee benefit
plans ultimately would receive their retirement benefits. See ERISA § 2(b), 29
U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982). Before ERISA, management abuses and the absence
of an effective and uniform means of regulating pension plans frequently re-
sulted in the loss of participants' anticipated benefits. Id.; see also Note, Fidu-
ciary Responsibility: Prudent Investments Under ERISA, 14 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 1066, 1068-69 (1980) (describing misconduct by trustees which deprives
participants of their pension plan benefits).
Congress included fiduciary standards in ERISA because full disclosure
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innocent plan participants along with their employers by dis-
qualifying plans from tax benefits when the employer misman-
aged plan funds.18 Federal law also provided criminal penalties
for those who abused plan assets, but did not provide for reme-
dial relief, restoration of plan assets, or enforcement of fiduci-
ary obligations.19 Benefit plans often contained exculpatory
clauses that insulated plan fiduciaries from liability and many
state courts upheld the validity of these clauses.20 The need to
protect plan participants spurred the passage of ERISA and in-
spired the congressional mandate for the courts to develop a
"federal common law" to govern ERISA disputes.2 1 Congress
and reporting requirements would not suffice to prevent abuse of employee
benefit plans. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams)
(noting full disclosure and reporting requirements are insufficient to prevent
abuses), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 5177, 5186.
18. See I.R.C. §§ 402-404, 501-503 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987) (prescribing tax
treatment of qualified benefit plans). Pre-ERISA regulations thus afforded
plan beneficiaries ineffective protection.
Because Congress designed the taxing of pension plans to produce revenue
and prevent evasion of tax obligations, it provided a weak safeguard for secur-
ing anticipated benefit rights. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIn. NEWs 4890, 4978. Tax rules,
although still important under ERISA, no longer represent the primary regu-
lation of employee benefit plans. Id. ERISA focuses on the protection of em-
ployee rights and benefits and the fiduciary obligations of those handling
employee benefit plan assets. Id.
19. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1982) (providing maximum penalties of five
years imprisonment or $10,000 fine or both against "[a]ny person who embez-
zles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully" misuses employee welfare benefit
plan funds). The Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act ("WPPDA") re-
quired plan administrators to file plans with the Secretary of Labor and send a
description and annual report of the plan to participants on written request,
but did not enforce fiduciary obligations. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1970) (re-
pealed 1974). WPPDA's limited disclosure requirements coupled with its com-
plete lack of substantive fiduciary standards failed to protect plan participants.
WPPDA also relied on the initiative of individual employees to police manage-
ment of pension plans. See S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (noting Act's
"chief procedural weakness [is] its reliance upon the initiative of the individual
employee to police the management of the plan"), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4841.
20. See, e.g., Drueding v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank & Trust, 319 Pa. 144,
156, 179 A. 229, 234 (1935) (exempting trustee from liability for loss under
trust containing exculpatory clause); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 222 (1959) (stating exculpatory clause in trust instrument may re-
lieve fiduciary of personal liability). ERISA invalidates exculpatory clauses re-
lieving fiduciaries of personal liability. See ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a)
(1982); see infra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing status of exculpa-
tory clauses under ERISA).
21. See supra note 17 (discussing abuses under prior law as impetus for
ERISA). Congress envisioned that a "body of [f]ederal substantive law [would]
be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations
1989] ERISA 1307
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also directed the courts to incorporate traditional trust law into
this federal common law by accommodating its principles to fit
the "nature and purposes of employee benefit plans.
' '22
1. Common-Law Protection of Trust Beneficiaries
Under common law, a fiduciary is one who acts not for per-
sonal benefit, but for the benefit of another-the beneficiary.
23
Thus a benefit plan trustee serving in this fiduciary capacity
has a common-law duty to act with a high degree of good faith
in response to the beneficiary's great confidence and trust.
24
The crux of the trust relationship therefore lies in the trustee's
obligation to act for the benefit of the beneficiary. 25
under private welfare and pension plans." 120 CoNG. REc. 29, 942 (1974) (state-
ment of Sen. Javits). Furthermore, Congress intended ERISA's fiduciary pro-
visions to reflect traditional principles of trust law. See S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (declaring that fiduciary sections of ERISA codify and adopt
certain principles of trust law), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 4838, 4865; see also Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d
1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984) ("But Congress realized that the bare terms, however
detailed, of these statutory provisions [ERISA] would not be sufficient to es-
tablish a comprehensive regulatory scheme. It accordingly empowered the
courts to develop, in the light of reason and experience, a body of federal com-
mon law governing employee benefit plans.").
In addition, ERISA § 514 preempts all state laws that "relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan" covered by its provisions. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1982). This broad preemption provision, along with the development of a fed-
eral common law interpreting ERISA, provides uniformity in the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of ERISA's provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (stating that ERISA was designed to foster uniformity of de-
cisions, which will help fiduciaries and participants predict legality of proposed
actions without necessity of referring to varying state laws), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4650.
22. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4865; H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4650. Congress rec-
ognized that employee benefit plans are quite different in "purpose and in na-
ture" from the testamentary and inter vivos trusts that trust law governs. Id.
Congress therefore directed the courts to interpret ERISA's fiduciary stan-
dards bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit
plans. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 302, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5083; see also Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331,
1337-38 (7th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that Congress intended to "codify the
principles of trust law with whatever alterations were needed to fit the needs
of employee benefit plans").
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); Scott, The Fiduciary
Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 540 (1949) (describing fiduciary as one who
undertakes to act in interest of another).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 2 comment b (1959).
25. See Williams v. Griffin, 35 Mich. App. 179, 183, 192 N.W.2d 283, 285
(1971) (stating fiduciary relationship exists when there is a "reposing of faith,
1308 [Vol. 73:1303
The common-law duty of loyalty requires a trustee to ad-
minister the trust solely in the interest of its beneficiaries. 26 In
carrying out this duty, a trustee must exercise the care and
skill of a reasonably prudent person and exercise any greater-
than-ordinary skill actually possessed.2 7 In contrast to relations
free from fiduciary obligations, courts require strict adherence
to this standard of trust because of the high degree of confi-
dence the beneficiary places in the trustee.28
Nonfiduciary third persons often participate in a trustee's
breach of fiduciary duty.29 Under common law, a beneficiary
confidence, and trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon the judgment
and advice of another"); see also Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 539, 541 (1949) (noting that scope of fiduciary's duty increases with
amount of independent authority fiduciary exercises).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
27. Id. § 174.
28. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). In
Mcinhard, Chief Judge (later Justice) Cardozo articulated his famous descrip-
tion of the stringent standard of behavior imposed on fiduciaries:
"Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sen-
sitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed
a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to under-
mine the rule of undivided loyalty .... Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd."
Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
29. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (third party participated
in trustee's sale of trust property); Carter Oil Co. v. Crude Oil Co., 201 F.2d
547, 551 (10th Cir. 1953) (nonfiduciary who knew co-tenant intended to misap-
propriate payments that should be shared by another co-tenant may be liable
for participating in breach of trust); Marshall v. Lovell, 19 F.2d 751, 753 (8th
Cir. 1927) (trustee bribed by nonfiduciary), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 616 (1928);
Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (D.D.C. 1971) (union participated
in conspiracy with employee welfare fund trustees and bank president know-
ingly allowed plan funds to be held in interest-free accounts); Malmud v.
Blackman, 278 N.Y. 658, 658, 16 N.E.2d 391, 391 (1938) (per curiam) (nonfiduci-
ary borrower who accepted usurious loan from trustee held liable for all loss
caused to estate); Zagrans v. Cohn, 404 Pa. 315, 319, 172 A.2d 291, 293 (1961)
(nonfiduciary sellers who induced trustee to make illegal investment held
jointly and severally liable for losses of trust property, when they knew or
ought to have known of breach of trust although purchase was in name of
trustee without trust label); Whitford v. Reddeman, 196 Wis. 10, 24-25, 219
N.W. 361, 366 (1928) (third party aided trustee in deceiving beneficiaries of in-
vestment trust regarding financial stability of trust); see also Stone, The Public
Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1934) (arguing departures from
fiduciary principles usually do not occur without active assistance of bar
members).
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has a reasonable expectation that third persons will not know-
ingly join the trustee in a breach of trust and third persons
have a corresponding duty not to join in such breaches.3 0 Pre-
sumably, the common law recognizes that beneficiaries may be
unable to obtain full relief without recovering against a nonfi-
duciary who knowingly participates in a fiduciary violation.31
For example, if a violating trustee is judgment-proof and a par-
ticipating nonfiduciary is not subject to liability, trust benefi-
ciaries are left without a remedy. Traditional trust principles
therefore allow beneficiaries to hold nonfiduciaries liable for
knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach of duty.3 2
This liability is limited to situations in which a nonfiduci-
ary knew or should have known that the fiduciary was violat-
ing the trust.3 3 Thus, a beneficiary must prove two elements to
recover in a suit against a nonfiduciary. First, the beneficiary
30. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 901
(rev. 2d ed. 1982) (recognizing beneficiary enjoys expectation that third per-
sons will not knowingly join with trustee in breach of trust); 4 A. SCOTT & W.
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 326.4 (1989) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 326 (1959) (stating that third person who, although not transferee
of trust property, has notice that trustee is committing breach of trust and par-
ticipates therein is liable to beneficiary for any loss caused by breach); Scott,
Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 HARv. L. REV. 454, 481 (1921) (arguing
that trust law places liability on third person for knowingly participating with
fiduciary in breach of his obligations but does not compel third person to su-
pervise conduct of fiduciary or hold third person liable for failing to do so).
31. For example, an unavailable or judgment-proof fiduciary would leave
a plan and its participants without relief. See, e.g., Brock v. Gerace, 635 F.
Supp. 563, 569 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding that plan participants and beneficiaries
would be denied full relief if nonfiduciaries, who unjustly reaped substantial
financial rewards from their knowing participation in breaches of fiduciary du-
ties, could not be held liable to plan under ERISA); see also Lowen v. Tower
Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing ne-
cessity of nonfiduciary liability under ERISA to pierce corporate form and pre-
vent channeling of profits from fiduciary breaches to nonfiduciary entities to
insulate them from liability under ERISA).
32. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1920) (holding nonfiduciaries
who joined fiduciary in sale of trust property to trustee jointly and severally
liable for profits obtained); Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Twohig, 224 F.2d 493,
498 (8th Cir. 1955) (stating that third person who colludes with fiduciary in
committing breach of duty is under duty of restitution to beneficiary); Whit-
ford v. Reddeman, 196 Wis. 10, 22-23, 219 N.W. 361, 365-66 (1928) (recognizing
court's power to enforce trust, compel trustee accounting, and hold liable those
who assist trustee in violation of trust); Massie v. Barth, 634 S.W.2d 208, 211
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that third party who has notice that trustee is
committing breach of trust and participates with trustee is liable to beneficiary
for any loss caused by breach of trust).
33. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 30, § 901, at 262 (recognizing
that issue in third-party liability suits is whether third person knew or should
have known breach of trust was being committed).
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must prove that the nonfiduciary acted or failed to act in a way
that furthered or completed the trustee's breach of trust.34 Sec-
ond, the beneficiary must prove that the nonfiduciary knew or
should have known that the trustee's action constituted a
breach of trust.35 Courts always will impose liability for know-
ing participation in any fiduciary breach of duty.36 Thus, at
common law, joint and several liability imposed on the fiduci-
ary and a participating nonfiduciary adequately compensated
beneficiaries for damages to the trust.3 7
2. ERISA
Title I of ERISA38 protects employee benefit plan partici-
pants by establishing reporting and disclosure requirements, 39
minimum participation requirements, 40 vesting41 and funding
34. See Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361, 1396 (D. Nev. 1984)
(holding nonfiduciary borrowers who knowingly assisted in fiduciary breach of
duty under ERISA liable because their acts furthered breach and they knew
or should have known transaction was breach); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
supra note 30, § 901, at 262.
35. See supra note 34.
36. See supra note 30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (1959); see
also Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 HARV. L. REV. 454, 455, 481-
82 (1921) (asserting that transferee of trust property who knows transfer is in
breach of trust unquestionably is liable to trust under trust law and arguing
that this principle should apply equally to persons who deal with trustees in
other capacities).
37. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1920) (holding that persons
who knowingly join fiduciary in breach of trust become jointly and severally
liable with fiduciary); Whitford v. Reddeman, 196 Wis. 10, 22-23, 219 N.W. 361,
365-66 (1928) (acknowledging that third party who knowingly assists trustee in
breach of trust is liable to same extent and in same manner as trustee).
38. ERISA §§ 2-515, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1982). ERISA has three other
titles. Title II, codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982), describes the
tax consequences of ERISA as an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code,
including the tax treatment of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and Ke-
ogh plans. Title III clarifies the jurisdiction of federal agencies and establishes
procedures for the joint enforcement of ERISA by the Labor and Treasury
Departments. ERISA §§ 3001-3043, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1982). Title IV cre-
ates a retirement plan termination insurance program administered by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Id. §§ 4001-4070, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1301-1370.
39. ERISA requires the disclosure of understandable and accurate de-
scriptions of plan terms and of information on the financial status and opera-
tion of plans to participants and to the federal government. Id. §§ 101-111, 209,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1059.
40. ERISA establishes permissible age and service conditions, including
waiting periods, for beginning participation in benefit accruals under pension
plans. Id §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061. Generally, a plan cannot exclude
employees on account of age or service if they are at least 21 years old or have
had at least one year of service. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A);
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standards,42 stringent fiduciary standards,43 and criminal and
civil liability for violations of its provisions,44 It is ERISA's
see, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 262, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 5038, 5044-46.
41. ERISA specifies rules for the vesting of pension benefits, most signifi-
cantly preretirement vesting for significant periods of service, and restrictions
on break-in-service rules that can cancel periods of service toward vesting.
ERISA §§ 203-207, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053-1057 (1982). A vested or "nonforfeitable"
right to accrued benefits gives a participant a claim to payment, on either an
immediate or deferred basis, of at least a percentage of benefits arising from
the participant's service. Id. § 3(19), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19); see also Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 363 & n.4 (1980) (finding
that Congress used terms vested and nonforfeitable synonymously in drafting
ERISA).
Before ERISA, many plans required long periods of continuous service for
vesting or provided vested benefits only upon retirement, causing "countless
numbers of American [workers to be] tragically victimized by unreasonable
vesting provisions." 119 CONG. REc. 30,042 (1973) (statement of Sen. Bentsen),
reprinted in 2 ERISA LEG. HIsT. 1634. "Vesting is the cornerstone of pension
reform" because a vested, or nonforfeitable, right is crucial to the actual re-
ceipt of benefits. 119 CONG. REC. 30,373 (1973) (statement of Sen. Hartke), re-
printed in 2 ERISA LEG. HIsT. 1773.
42. ERISA imposes funding standards for defined benefit plan obligations.
ERISA §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1982). A defined benefit plan
promises a participant a specific amount of pension benefits at retirement. Id.
Funding refers to the accumulation of sufficient assets in a plan to assure
the availability of funds for payment of benefits to entitled participants. H.R.
REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 4639, 4645. Congress intended to fulfill the promise and commit-
ment of a pension plan by ensuring the availability of plan funds owed to
participants. Id.
43. ERISA defines a fiduciary in terms of functional realities regardless of
the title or position of the acting person. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1114 (1982). Anyone who has "discretionary authority or discretionary con-
trol" over "management of such plan," "management or disposition of its as-
sets," the "administration of such plan," or "investment advice... with respect
to any moneys or other property," of the plan is a fiduciary under ERISA. Id.
§ 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
Plan fiduciaries must discharge their duties "solely in the interest of par-
ticipants and beneficiaries." Id. § 404(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(1). A professional
standard of conduct governs any exercise of discretionary authority under an
employee benefit plan. ERISA requires a fiduciary to act with "the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence ... that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims." Id. Thus, under ERISA, "a pure heart and an
empty head are not enough." Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467
(5th Cir. 1983).
44. ERISA §§ 501-515, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145 (1982). Section 501 autho-
rizes criminal penalties against any person who willfully violates any of ER-
ISA's reporting and disclosure requirements. Id. § 1131. Section 502 permits
participants and beneficiaries to enforce their rights under the terms of plans
and their statutory rights under ERISA. 1d. § 1132. Plan fiduciaries, as advo-
cates for the interests of participants and beneficiaries, may seek to enjoin or
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broad fiduciary responsibility standards that provide the most
visible protection for plan participants.
ERISA defines a fiduciary as a person who "exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting man-
agement or disposition of its [plan] assets. '45 ERISA imposes
extensive affirmative duties on plan fiduciaries to act solely in
the best interest of the plan.46 It also requires fiduciaries to act
for the exclusive purpose of "providing benefits to [plan] par-
ticipants and their beneficiaries. '47 This "exclusive purpose"
rule reflects the common-law duty of loyalty48 and attempts to
curb self-dealing in the management of plan funds.
Congress attempted to provide employee benefit plans
greater protection, however, by imposing a stricter standard of
care on fiduciaries than that existing under the common law of
trusts.4 9 ERISA holds plan fiduciaries to the standard of con-
duct of a prudent person "acting in like capacity and familiar
with such matters."50 Unlike the common law, which requires
only that the trustee act in accordance with the skills and
knowledge the trustee actually possesses,5 1 ERISA requires the
trustee to have a minimum level of skill and knowledge.
ERISA also attempts to curb self-dealing and ensure that
plan fiduciaries act exclusively in the interest of plan partici-
obtain other appropriate equitable relief for a violation of the terms of a plan
or a violation of Title I. Id The Department of Labor has the authority to
bring an action to enjoin or obtain other appropriate relief for any violation of
Title I. Id. Under section 502(a)(2), the Secretary of Labor, along with partici-
pants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries, can seek appropriate relief for a fiduci-
ary's breach of duty as provided in section 409. Id.
45. ERISA, § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982). Fiduciary status
under ERISA does not depend on a person's title or position but on whether
the person's actions, or lack of action, fall within the confines of section
3(21)(A). See supra notes 3, 43.
46. See, e.g., ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982).
47. Id.; see also Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984) (declar-
ing that fiduciary must act under "unwavering duty.., to make decisions with
single-minded devotion to a plan's participants and beneficiaries"); RESTATE-
MIENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959) (imposing duty on trustee to admin-
ister trust solely in beneficiary's interest).
48. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
49. "Any comprehensive program to prevent abuses in our private retire-
ment system must also focus on the area of fiduciary responsibility .... Work-
ers' pension funds deserve strong fiduciary protections to insure that their
interests are not subordinated to ['insiders' of the plan]. This bill will establish
judicially enforceable standards to insure honest, faithful, and competent man-
agement of pension and welfare funds." 120 CONG. REC. 29,951 (1974) (state-
ment of Sen. Bentsen).
50. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982).
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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pants by prohibiting fiduciaries from engaging in certain deal-
ings with "parties in interest."52 Under ERISA, parties in
interest include plan administrators, fiduciaries, persons provid-
ing services to the plan, employers, employee organizations cov-
ered by the plan, and certain relatives and partners of parties in
interest.53 Fiduciaries may not involve the plan in a transaction
if they know or should know that the transaction directly or in-
directly constitutes a prohibited transaction with a party in
interest.1
Transactions between plans and parties in interest prohib-
52. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4651; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4838, 4866-67; see Marshall
v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 352-53 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (holding that loan of plan
assets to party in interest was prohibited transaction regardless of actual harm
to plan because ERISA was intended to prevent transactions that present high
risk of loss to plan).
53. ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1982). ERISA generally prohibits
fiduciaries from dealing on the plan's behalf with parties in interest. ERISA
§ 406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (1982). ERISA's definition of a party in in-
terest as to an employee benefit includes:
(A) any fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any administrator,
officer, trustee, or custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee
benefit plan;
(B) a person providing services to such plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan;
(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by
such plan[.]
ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1982).
54. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 306-307, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5087. A fiduciary is liable for
losses to a plan from prohibited transactions only if a prudent person would
have known that ERISA prohibited the transaction. Id; see infra note 56 and
accompanying text.
Congress did not intend to impose liability on a plan fiduciary where the
other party to a transaction happens, by chance, to be a party in interest. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 307, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5038, 5087. For example, if a transaction involves an
ordinary "blind" purchase or sale of securities through an exchange where
neither buyer nor seller knows the identity of the other party involved, a
court should not hold the plan fiduciary liable just because the other party
turns out to be a party in interest. Id.
Section 502(i) of ERISA imposes civil penalties on parties in interest, re-
ferred to as "disqualified persons" under ERISA's tax provisions, who partici-
pate in prohibited transactions. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i) (1982). ERISA
inflicts an initial excise tax of five percent of the amount involved in a prohib-
ited transaction against the party in interest. Id. Upon notice from the Secre-
tary of Labor, the party in interest must correct the prohibited transaction or
face additional taxes up to 100% of the prohibited transaction. Id. To correct
the prohibited transaction, a party in interest must undo the prohibited trans-
action to the extent possible and allow the plan to receive the benefit of the
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ited under ERISA include direct or indirect sale, exchange, or
lease of property, lending of money or exchange of credit by a
plan on behalf of a party in interest, and direct or indirect
transfer of any plan income or assets to or for the benefit of a
party in interest.55 Before engaging the plan in any transaction,
plan fiduciaries must investigate prudently whether such trans-
bargain realized in the transaction. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 322, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5102.
Thus, Congress intended to regulate parties in interest under tax law and
through its consequences rather than through potential liability to employee
benefit plans. This different treatment makes sense because a party in inter-
est who takes part in a prohibited transaction incurs a tax penalty regardless
of whether the violation was inadvertent, while plan fiduciaries face liability
under ERISA only if they knew or should have known the transaction in-
volved a party in interest. Compare H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 321 (stating that initial excise tax on party in interest is imposed without
regard to whether party in interest knew transaction violated ERISA), re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5101 with H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 306 (declaring fiduciaries liable for losses to
plan from prohibited transaction only if they knew the transaction was prohib-
ited), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5087.
55. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 307, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADNIIN. NEWS 5038, 5087. Congress designed ERISA's pro-
hibited transaction provisions to prevent plan fiduciaries from engaging in
transactions that afford a high potential for loss or insider abuse. Id.
Under ERISA § 406(a), a fiduciary with respect to a plan
"shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or
should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect -
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between the plan
and a party in interest;
(B) lending of money or other extension of credit between the plan
and a party in interest;
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a
party in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, of
any assets of the plan[.]
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (1982); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
To avoid disrupting established business practices, ERISA provides both
statutory and administrative exemptions from its prohibited transaction provi-
sions. 1d. § 408, 29 U.S. § 1108. Under § 408(b), a plan can make a loan to a
participant or beneficiary, a party in interest may provide necessary services to
a plan if no more than reasonable compensation is paid, and parties in interest
can extend credit to an employee stock ownership plan if they charge a rea-
sonable interest rate. Id. § 1108(b); see generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 309-16 (stating financial institutions that perform fiduciary
functions often provide adequate safeguards for plans and describing transac-
tions allowed under section 408(b)), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5038, 5092-97.
Moreover, the Secretary of Labor may grant administrative variances if a
transaction between a plan and a party in interest is in the best interests of the
plan and furnishes substantial protection to plan participants and benefi-
ciaries. ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1982). Such variances may be ab-
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actions would involve a party in interest.56 This duty to investi-
gate whether such a relationship exists varies with the
significance and frequency of the contemplated transactions.5 7
ERISA's description of parties in interest and prohibited trans-
actions thus allows a plan fiduciary to determine whether the
statute restricts a contemplated transaction. ERISA also pro-
hibits the use of exculpatory clauses to circumvent its stringent
fiduciary provisions.58 By creating a wide variety of remedies
under ERISA, Congress clearly sought to provide meaningful
relief for plan participants as well as to deter deviation from
ERISA's fiduciary standards.59
a. Relief for Plans and Plan Participants
Congress enacted several provisions to ensure strict compli-
ance with ERISA in order to protect plan participants. 60 Sec-
solute or conditional and may apply to a particular transaction or to a class of
transactions. Id.
Congress stressed, however, that statutory exemptions and administrative
variances would not affect application of ERISA's fiduciary responsibilities.
See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 310-11 (stating that ER-
ISA's fiduciary rules requiring prudent action, diversification of investments,
and actions exclusively for benefit of participants and beneficiaries apply even
to transaction exempted by the Secretary), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5092.
56. See, e.g., Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 351 (W.D. Okla. 1978)
(stating that fiduciary has duty reasonably to investigate whether party in in-
terest relationship exists).
57. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 307, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5087.
58. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1982) (invalidating exculpatory
clauses insulating fiduciaries from personal liability under ERISA). For com-
mon-law treatment of exculpatory provisions in trust instruments, see supra
note 20 and accompanying text. Section 410(b) permits fiduciaries to purchase
liability insurance, either at their own or the plan's expense, provided the pol-
icy allows recourse against the fiduciary who violates a fiduciary duty. Id.
§ 1110(b).
59. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams)
(declaring prevention of transactions that deplete or endanger plan assets a
goal of ERISA's fiduciary provisions), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5186.
Moreover, § 502(a)(3) authorizes appropriate relief for fiduciary breaches
of duty. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1982). Section 405 subjects a fiduciary
to liability for certain breaches of fiduciary responsibility by another fiduciary.
Id. § 1105. Section 409 imposes liability for breaches of any fiduciary responsi-
bilities, obligations, or duties created by Title I. Id. § 1109.
60. See S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (declaring ERISA's en-
forcement provisions designed specifically to give Secretary of Labor, partici-
pants, and beneficiaries broad remedies to redress or prevent violations of
ERISA), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4871. Fur-
thermore, Congress intended to provide the full range of legal and equitable
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tion 502(a)(2) creates a cause of action for either the plan, a
beneficiary, or a participant to obtain relief on behalf of the
plan for fiduciary breaches of duty.6 1 ERISA therefore entitles
plans covered by the Act to collect damages from a fiduciary
who violates a fiduciary duty.62 Specifically, section 409(a),
cited in section 502(a)(2), imposes liability on a fiduciary for
any losses incurred by the plan resulting from a breach of fidu-
ciary duty.6 3 In addition to redressing the harm the fiduciary
violation caused the plan,6 a fiduciary must return any profits
gained from the misuse of plan assets.6 5 Finally, the court may
also award "appropriate relief" if the court deems such relief
necessary. 66
Individual plan participants and beneficiaries can obtain
plan-related equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA
for fiduciary actions that do not amount to a breach of fiduciary
duty.67 A plan participant or beneficiary also may bring a civil
remedies available in both state and federal courts and to enforce fiduciary re-
sponsibilities by removing jurisdictional and procedural obstacles. Id.; see also
120 CONG. REc. 29, 929 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) (discussing ER-
ISA's protective provisions, including judicial remedies designed to assure
compliance), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5177-78.
61. Section 502(a)(2) states:
(a) A civil action may be brought...
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title[.]
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1982).
ERISA § 409 consists of two subsections: § 409(a) establishes liability for
breaches of fiduciary duty, while § 409(b) protects fiduciaries from liability for
breaches committed either before or after they served as fiduciaries. Id.
§ 1109; see supra note 44. Courts often cite § 409 generally when they intend
to cite to § 409(a).
62. See supra note 61 (quoting § 502(a)(2)); infra note 63 (quoting
§ 409(a)).
63. ERISA § 409(a) provides in relevant part:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiducia-
ries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such
plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to
restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through the use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall
be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982).
64. See Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462 (10th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that
trust law method for redressing fiduciary breach is to put trust in position it
occupied prior to violation); infra note 131.
65. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1982).
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
67. ERISA § 502 provides in part:
Persons empowered to bring a civil action
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suit under section 502(a)(3) to enjoin activities that violate any
ERISA provision, and for other equitable relief to redress viola-
tions or enforce the plan or ERISA.68 Thus, the courts can,
under congressional mandate, grant "appropriate equitable re-
lief" to protect plans and plan participants by fashioning addi-
tional remedies to complement ERISA's enforcement
provisions.6
9
b. The Remedial Sections and Nonfiduciaries
Taken together, the remedial provisions of ERISA provide
extensive relief against breaches of fiduciary duty. When con-
strued strictly, however, these remedial provisions leave plans
and participants without recourse to recover lost funds when a
nonfiduciary participates in a fiduciary violation.70 Section
(a) A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; ....
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of
this title or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of
the plan; ...
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982).
68. Congress restricted the coverage of § 502(a)(3) to equitable relief for
general violations of ERISA that are not breaches of fiduciary duty. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3) (1982). General violations of ERISA include variation from mini-
mum reporting, vesting, funding, and participation standards. See supra notes
39-43 (describing minimum standards ERISA established to protect employee
benefit plans); see also Hillis v. Waukesha Title Co., 576 F. Supp. 1103, 1109
(E.D. Wis. 1983) (refusing to enforce undisclosed forfeiture provision as "ap-
propriate equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3)).
69. See Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1266-67, 1287 (D.N.J. 1980) (ac-
knowledging that "ERISA grants the court wide discretion in fashioning legal
and equitable relief to make the plan whole and protect the rights of benefi-
ciaries, including recission of unlawful transactions and recovery of monetary
loss to the plan"). See supra notes 16, 21 and accompanying text; infra notes
90-93 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 106-11 (illustrating how Ninth Circuit's narrow read-
ing of ERISA's remedies led to rejection of nonfiduciary liability principle).
But see Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that ERISA "like the Civil Rights Acts . . . is remedial legislation
which should be liberally construed in favor of protecting participants"); Ret-
tig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (giv-
ing ERISA's remedial purpose "due weight in construing provisions whose
language and specific legislative history are susceptible of varying interpreta-
tions"); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 126 (7th Cir. 1984) (expressing reluctance
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409(a) imposes liability, including personal responsibility, for
plan losses incurred due to a fiduciary's breach of duty.7 1 Sec-
tion 502(a)(2) 72 creates a representative cause of action to ob-
tain equitable and legal plan-related relief against a fiduciary
who is liable under section 409(a). Section 502(a)(3) also pro-
vides an individual participant or beneficiary a personal cause
of action for equitable relief.73 This section, however, does not
require violators to reimburse losses sustained by the plan.
Under the common law of trusts, nonfiduciaries are jointly
and severally liable, along with fiduciaries, for losses resulting
from knowing participation in a fiduciary breach of duty.7 4
Although ERISA does not explicitly provide for liability against
nonfiduciaries, the overall remedial purpose of ERISA and
Congress's intention to incorporate the common law of trusts
into ERISA75 permits courts to impose such liability on
nonfiduciaries to reimburse affected plans.
B. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ERISA's REMEDIES
1. The Limits of Fiduciary Liability - Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Russell
The United States Supreme Court has restricted fiduciary
liability under ERISA to claims brought on behalf of a plan.7 6
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,7 7 an in-
dividual beneficiary sued a plan fiduciary for untimely process-
ing of benefits claims and requested punitive damages under
to construe narrowly ERISA's protective provisions in light of Congress's over-
riding concern with protection of plan participants).
At common law, courts afforded relief to protect the rights of beneficiaries
as the situation required. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 230 Md. 248, 255, 186 A.2d
590, 594 (1962) (holding that court may mold relief to suit circumstances and is
not bound by any particular rule).
ERISA's remedial provisions may provide complete relief to a plan, its
participants, and beneficiaries if a fiduciary is financially responsible and not
judgment-proof. When a plan fiduciary is judgment-proof, however, partici-
pants cannot, under a strict reading of the Act's remedial provisions, recover
plan losses from nonfiduciaries who join in a breach of duty unless the courts
are willing to incorporate the traditional standards of liability under trust law.
See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 21-22, 69 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148
(1985).
77. Id
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section 409(a).7 8 The Court held that a plan participant cannot
claim extra-contractual damages against a fiduciary under sec-
tion 502(a)(2) 79 as "appropriate relief under section 409[a]" 80 for
a breach of fiduciary duty.8 1
The Court first found that because section 409(a) requires a
fiduciary who violates a fiduciary duty to restore "losses to the
plan," section 409(a) authorizes relief to protect the plan but
not individuals benefiting under the plan.8 2 The Court rea-
soned that this result was mandated by the language of section
409(a) and, moreover, was consistent with Congress's focus on
preventing the misuse of plan assets and providing remedies to
protect the financial integrity of the plan as a whole.8 3 The
Court also noted a stark absence of support for punitive dam-
ages in ERISA and its legislative history, in contrast to the self-
evident congressional concern for safeguarding contractually
defined benefits under plans covered by ERISA.8 4 Because the
complaining participant received all the benefits to which she
was contractually entitled under the plan, the Court declined to
imply an individual claim for extra-contractual damages be-
cause of the "comprehensive and reticulated" statutory scheme
of ERISA.8 5
2. Federal Courts and Nonfiduciary Liability Under ERISA
Congress intended ERISA's remedial provisions to "make
applicable the law of trusts" to employee benefit plans.
8 6
Under traditional trust principles, courts may hold third per-
sons liable for knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach of
duty.87 Incorporating nonfiduciary liability promotes compli-
78. Id. at 137.
79. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 61-66, 71 and accompanying text.
81. 473 U.S. at 148.
82. Id. at 140-42.
83. Id. at 140, 142 n.9 (noting that financial integrity of plan is common
interest shared by all parties authorized to bring actions on behalf of employee
benefit plans under section 502(a)(2)).
84. Id. at 140, 141 n.8 (describing attention Congress gave to prevention of
pension fund abuse in legislative history of ERISA).
85. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,
446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). But see infra note 119 and accompanying text.
86. 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5186. The goals of the fiduci-
ary provisions, as stated by Senator Williams, are "to establish uniform fiduci-
ary standards to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger plan assets;
and to provide effective remedies for breaches of trust." Id.
87. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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ance with ERISA and protects plan funds and participants.
Many federal courts thus have resolved the question of nonfi-
duciary liability under ERISA's remedial provisions in favor of
employee benefit plans.8 8 These courts uniformly impose liabil-
ity on nonfiduciaries for knowingly assisting a fiduciary in a
breach of fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA.8 9 Because Con-
gress intended to federalize and apply the common law of
trusts, these courts reason that they should incorporate the ba-
sic trust principle that enforces nonfiduciary liability into ER-
ISA's fiduciary duty provisions.90
In the seminal case Freund v. Marshall & Jisley Bank,91
the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin deter-
mined that ERISA permitted federal courts to award the relief
available under traditional trust law principles against
nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a breach of trust.92
Other federal courts later followed Freund and adopted this
principle, arguing that it furthers the statute's purpose of pro-
viding to plan beneficiaries the broadest relief possible under
ERISA.93 The Ninth Circuit in Nieto v. Ecker,94 however, re-
88. See cases cited supra note 7; infra note 93 and accompanying text. But
see irfra note 95 and accompanying text.
89. See cases cited supra note 7.
90. Congress designed ERISA "to make applicable the law of trusts... to
establish uniform fiduciary standards to prevent transactions which dissipate
or endanger plan assets; and to provide effective remedies for breaches of
trust." 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5186.
91. 485 F. Supp. 629, 641-42 (W.D. Wis. 1979). In Freund, plan fiduciaries
permitted the plan to loan all of its assets back to sponsoring companies in ex-
change for unsecured promissory notes. Id. at 636. Nonfiduciary sellers fur-
thered the fiduciaries's breaches and completed the breaches by directly
participating with plan trustees in the sale of the business in which the
breaches occurred and by accepting the benefits of the fiduciaries's breach. Id.
at 642. Although the nonfiduciary sellers were aware, prior to the consumma-
tion of the sale, of the actual harm to the plan, they continued with the trans-
action. Id.
92. Id. at 635. The court recognized that effectuation of ERISA's fiduciary
standards is best accomplished by consistent application of traditional trust
law. Id. The court also stated that, because ERISA is a remedial statute
designed to protect participants, courts should enforce remedies which best
carry out plans' purposes and are most advantageous to plan participants. Id.
at 641-42. But see Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1988) (criticiz-
ing reasoning of Freund and admonishing other courts for uncritically ac-
cepting Freund's rationale and thus building very much on very little).
93. Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding that nonfiduciary liability, authorized by trust law princi-
ples and ERISA's remedial provisions, is necessary to prevent parties from
shifting fiduciary obligations to one legal entity while channeling self-dealing
profits to separate legal entity under their control); Thornton v. Evans, 692
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fused to grant relief under ERISA against a nonfiduciary who
participated in a fiduciary's breach of duty.
95
II. NIETO V. ECKER: RECOVERY AGAINST A
NONFIDUCIARY WHO PARTICIPATES IN A
FIDUCIARY BREACH OF DUTY
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REJECTION OF NONFIDUCIARY
LIABILITY
In Nieto v. Ecker, the trustees of multiemployer employee
benefit plans96 ("Funds") financed by mandatory employer con-
tributions97 hired an attorney, the defendant, to collect delin-
quent employer contributions. 98 Plan participants filed an
action and alleged that the defendant continued to charge legal
fees for his services 99 even after the court had dismissed the
claims against the defaulting employers for lack of
prosecution. 0 0
F.2d 1064, 1079 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding remedy under ERISA against nonfidu-
ciary who conspires in fiduciary breach of trust, because Congress did not ex-
pressly address all issues that might arise under ERISA and thus courts
should develop substantive law of ERISA to accommodate its remedial pur-
poses); Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563, 569 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that un-
contradicted legislative intent to provide full equitable and legal remedies for
plans and plan participants supports imposition of nonfiduciary liability); Don-
ovan v. The Unicorn Group, 3 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1667
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (reasoning that ERISA allows civil actions against
nonfiduciaries because no equitable explanation or inconsistent legislative his-
tory requires courts to preclude such relief).
94. 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988).
95. 1d at 874.
96. See ERISA § 210, 29 U.S.C. § 1060 (1982) (describing participation and
vesting requirements for multiemployer plans). Plans financed by more than
one employer's contributions are multiple-employer plans, regardless of
whether a collective bargaining agreement established the plan. Internal Rev-
enue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 413(b)-(c) (1986). ERISA defines multi-employer plans
as those requiring more than one employer to contribute pursuant to collective
bargaining agreements. ERISA § 3(37)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (37)(A) (1982); see
generally S. BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 27-29 (BNA
1987) (describing four characteristics distinguishing multi-employer plans from
single-employer plans: union's appointment of half of plan trustees; plan
trustee's determination of levels of benefits and terms for benefit eligibility;
participants' ability to piece together service with different employers under
one plan in determining accrued benefits and vesting; and plan's relative fi-
nancial security).
97. See ERISA § 2(37)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A) (1982); see also supra
note 96.
98. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 870.
99. See supra note 11.
100. See supra note 10.
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On discovering the defendant's deceptions, the plan trust-
ees concealed the fraudulent fee charges. 0 1 Rather than de-
mand full reimbursement, the trustees allowed the defendant
to repay only a portion of his unearned fees in monthly install-
ments.1 0 2 In addition, the trustees retained the defendant's
legal services and permitted him to pad his subsequent bills to
offset these payments to the Funds.1 03 The plan participants
brought suit on behalf of the Funds to recover losses from the
trustees and the defendant.1 04 The District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California dismissed the ERISA claims against
the defendant because the complaint failed to show that he was
a Fund fiduciary.10 5
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the defendant was not a fi-
duciary of the Funds under ERISA. L0 6 The court further held
that ERISA section 409(a) 10 7 does not extend to one who con-
spires or acts to assist a fiduciary in a breach of duty.1 08 The
101. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 10, at 7-8. Plan participants al-
leged that the trustees of the Funds concealed the scope of the defendant's
fraud in four ways: failing to report the matter to the United States Depart-
ment of Labor; failing to report defendant's actions to the California State Bar;
failing to discharge defendant and continuing to use his services; and failing to
investigate fully the number of cases actually dismissed and lost. Id
102. Id. Plaintiff participants contended that the trustees of the Fund and
the defendant struck a "sweetheart" deal. This agreement required the de-
fendant to repay only $150,000 of the approximately $550,000 lost by the Funds
in contributions and attorney fees. The terms of the deal required the defend-
ant to repay with a $15,000 down payment and monthly installments of $3000
thereafter. The trustees also did not charge interest on the $150,000 and did
not secure the balance. Id
103. Plan participants alleged that the Funds would recover none of the
$550,000 in lost contributions and fraudulent attorney fees because the deal al-
lowed the defendant to charge excessive future fees. Id.
104. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 870.
105. Id The district court's decision is an unpublished opinion and the
Ninth Circuit's opinion does not describe the specific allegations of the com-
plaint. Thus, for purposes of addressing whether ERISA provides a claim
against a nonfiduciary, this Comment accepts as accurate the appellants' reci-
tation of facts supporting their claim against the defendant. Beyond this lim-
ited scope, this Comment does not express an opinion on the truth of the
allegations.
106. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871. The court rejected the claim that an attorney
who fails to collect delinquent employer contributions is a fiduciary under sec-
tion 3(21)(A) of ERISA, and held that the complaint did not allege sufficient
facts to find the defendant possessed any authority other than professional du-
ties toward the Funds. See also Yeseta v. Baima, 837 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir.
1988) (excluding from fiduciary status under ERISA attorney who renders
professional services to plan if attorney does not exercise any authority over
plan beyond usual professional functions).
107. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
108. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871-73. The Nieto court found that § 409(a)'s plain
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court additionally held that the equitable remedies of section
502(a)(3)109 did not provide a claim for damages against a nonfi-
duciary because such recovery would render the damages provi-
sion of section 409(a) superfluous.1 0 The court reasoned that if
Congress had intended section 502(a)(3) to provide recovery for
damages, it would not have allowed explicitly for such recovery
in section 409(a).' 1 '
The defendant was a "party in interest" 112 under ERISA,
however, because he provided legal services to the Funds. As a
party in interest, the Ninth Circuit held, the defendant could be
liable under ERISA for engaging in prohibited transactions
with a plan fiduciary."33 The court therefore remanded the
case to determine the defendant's equitable obligations as a
party in interest under section 502(a)(3).314
The Ninth Circuit's rejection of nonfiduciary liability con-
travenes ERISA's broad remedial purpose. 1 5 Moreover, be-
cause nonfiduciaries who are not parties in interest often assist
language limited its coverage to fiduciaries. Id. at 871. The Ninth Circuit also
concluded that nothing in the statute provided support for extending liability
to other parties under § 409(a). Id. The Ninth Circuit further held that ER-
ISA's legislative history did not justify incorporation of nonfiduciary liability
into its remedial provisions. IHL
The Nieto court characterized the participant's complaint against the de-
fendant as a simple malpractice suit under state law. Id at 871. This charac-
terization, however, jeopardizes ERISA's goal of uniform enforcement by
forcing plan participants to seek a mixture of state and federal remedies. See
supra note 21.
109. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
110. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873. Section 502(a)(3) allows only equitable relief
while § 502(a)(2) permits both equitable and legal relief. If legal remedies
were available under § 502(a)(3), then the provisions would be identical and
§ 409 would be rendered impotent because § 502(a)(3) would encompass an ac-
tion for breach of fiduciary duties.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
113. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873-74. Although § 406(a), see supra note 55, prohib-
its only certain transactions by fiduciaries and does not expressly bar parties in
interest from engaging in these transactions, the court relied on its equitable
powers to redress ERISA violations by imposing limited liability on the de-
fendant as a party in interest. 845 F.2d at 874; see also McDougall v. Donovan,
539 F. Supp. 596, 598-99 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that court may order equita-
ble relief under § 502(a)(3) against party in interest who participates in prohib-
ited transaction). In addition to ignoring the tax penalties ERISA imposes on
parties in interest for engaging in prohibited transactions, see supra note 54,
the Ninth Circuit effectively deprived the Funds of a remedy under ERISA for
damages against the defendant, a nonfiduciary.
114. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 874.
115. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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fiduciaries in violating ERISA,116 the Ninth Circuit decision ef-
fectively removes a traditional trust law remedy essential for
safeguarding employees and their benefit plans.
B. ERISA's REMEDIES AND THE RATIONALE
OF THE NIETO COURT
1. The Ninth Circuit's Misinterpretation of Russell
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Nieto upset the building
consensus among federal courts that nonfiduciaries, as well as
fiduciaries, face liability under section 409(a) for knowing par-
ticipation in a breach of fiduciary duty.1 1 7 The Ninth Circuit
reached its conclusion by rigidly applying the Supreme Court's
dictum in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Rus-
sell, 1 8 suggesting that courts should be reluctant to tamper
with the "comprehensive and reticulated" statutory scheme of
ERISA.119 The Ninth Circuit ignored the significant differ-
ences between extra-contractual damages claimed by a bene-
ficiary, which was the Russell court's concern, 20  and
116. See cases cited supra note 7.
117. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
118. 473 U.S. 134 (1985); see id at 149-52 (Brennan, J., concurring) (charac-
terizing that portion of Russell decision as dicta).
119. I& at 146-47 (1985) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). But see id- at 156-57 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(rejecting language suggesting that Congress created ERISA with carefully in-
tegrated remedies preventing courts from fashioning appropriate relief); S.
BRUCE, supra note 96, at 299-303 (arguing that broad preemptive power of ER-
ISA and congressional mandate to create federal common law authorizes
courts to develop participant protections to deal with full range of problems
Congress intended to address under ERISA).
The scope of this "reluctance" has caused confusion regarding the availa-
bility of extra-contractual and punitive damages under ERISA. Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence in Russell emphasizes that lower courts should not read the
majority's broad language against implied remedies of extra-contractual dam-
ages under ERISA to resolve whether such damages are available under
§ 502(a)(3). Russell, 473 U.S. at 150-51 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also infra
note 134 and accompanying text (suggesting that Supreme Court restricted
§ 409(a) to plan-related relief because § 502(a)(3) already provides adequate re-
lief for plan participants and beneficiaries).
Accordingly, post-Russell decisions have differed on the availability of ex-
tra-contractual damages under § 502(a)(3). Compare Haytcher v. ABS Indus.,
Inc., 7 Employee Benefit Cas. (BNA) 2158, 2163 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (upholding
individual claim for extra-contractual damages under § 502(a)(3) where "will-
ful" contract violation alleged) with Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that Russell decision precludes any claim for extra-contrac-
tual damages in § 502(a)(3) action).
120. The Ninth Circuit contended that the Supreme Court's decision in
Russell supports restricting § 409(a) to fiduciaries. Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d
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reimbursement of funds to an employee benefit plan protected
by ERISA.121
ERISA's remedial provisions distinguish relief granted on
behalf of employee benefit plans from relief awarded to indi-
vidual participants or beneficiaries. 22  Recovery against
nonfiduciaries who participate with a plan fiduciary in a breach
of duty is a plan-oriented remedy because the entire plan suf-
fers from the violation.1 23 In Russell, the participant sought pu-
nitive damages as an individual under an ERISA provision-
section 409(a)-that is limited to plan-oriented relief.1 24 Nieto,
however, involved participants seeking relief on behalf of their
plans for damages caused by a nonfiduciary conspiring with
plan trustees to breach a fiduciary obligation. 25 Although the
question of nonfiduciary liability involves construction of ER-
ISA's enforcement provisions,126 the Ninth Circuit did not rec-
868, 872 (9th Cir. 1988). The court dismissed pre-Russell decisions extending
§ 409(a) liability to nonfiduciaries by indicating these holdings may be bad law
"in light of the guidance provided by Russell." Id. at 872-73. This argument,
however, does not explain post-Russell opinions such as Brock v. Hendershott,
840 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1988), which imposed nonfiduciary liability under ER-
ISA. Id. at 342.
121. Equity principles traditionally govern trust law, and courts therefore
apply equitable remedies to redress a trustee's breach of duty. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959). Equity principles require courts to
place beneficiaries in the position they would have occupied but for the
trustee's breach of trust. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 30, § 863.
Despite the merger of trust and equity, the majority of courts deny punitive
damages in breach of trust cases under a strict procedural approach. See
Carter Equip. Co. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 681 F.2d 386, 396 (5th Cir.
1982) (stating that "fiduciary duties are creatures of equity.., and... punitive
damages are not recoverable in a court of equity").
Other courts have relied on trust principles to deny punitive claims
against a trustee. See Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780
F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (limiting recovery to loss caused to trust because
punitive damages are not generally available in action by beneficiary against
trustee), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986). But see Goggin v. Moss, 221 F. Supp.
905, 920 (N.D. Tex. 1962) (assessing punitive damages against trustee for fraud-
ulent and flagrant misconduct).
122. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's re-
medial provisions).
123. See Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1079-80 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating
that recovery against nonfiduciaries must be sought on behalf of plan or by
beneficiaries in class action because claim touches interest of every
beneficiary).
124. Russell, 473 U.S. at 141-42. Although the plan fiduciaries in Russell
eventually paid the participant all benefits to which she contractually was en-
titled, she also sought punitive damages under § 409(a). Id. at 137; see also
supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing Russell decision).
125. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 870.
126. See Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc. 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d
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ognize the separate treatment of plan remedies on the one hand
and participant remedies on the other. As a result, the court
erroneously applied the rationale of Russell127 to Nieto, and re-
jected plantiffs' proposal that plans covered by ERISA may re-
cover against nonfiduciaries who participate in a fiduciary
violation.328
Under ERISA, restoration of plan losses caused by fiduci-
ary violations is necessary to protect participants and their em-
ployee benefit plans? 2 9 Unlike the propriety of granting
punitive damages,130 federal courts uniformly authorize restora-
tion of plan losses under ERISA's remedial scheme. 31
Although punitive damages may deter variance from ERISA, 32
Cir. 1987) (deriving authority for recovery against nonfiduciaries from trust
law principles and ERISA's remedial provisions); Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp.
563, 566-67 (D.N.J. 1986) (analyzing remedial provisions of ERISA and con-
cluding that imposition of nonfiduciary liability is consistent with congres-
sional intent behind ERISA); McDougall v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 596, 599
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (stating that ERISA's remedial provisions should not be con-
strued so narrowly as to defeat traditional principles of common law of trusts).
127. "In light of this holding, we do not reach any question concerning the
extent to which § 409[a] may authorize recovery of extra-contractual compen-
satory or punitive damages from a fiduciary by a plan." Russell, 473 U.S. at
144 n.12 (emphasis in original); see also supra notes 81-85, 124 and accompany-
ing text.
128. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 874; see supra notes 95, 106-11 and accompanying
text.
129. Congress created minimum standards to ensure the equitable charac-
ter and financial soundness of employee benefit plans and thus protect partici-
pants and their interests. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). The policy of
ERISA further provided plan participants and their beneficiaries with "appro-
priate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts" to safe-
guard their interests in their plans. Id. § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Russell recognized the importance ER-
ISA's drafters placed on protecting contractually defined benefit rights under
employee benefit plans. See 473 U.S. at 148.
130. See supra note 121.
131. Courts agree that the remedial goal of ERISA is to make participants
whole and restore plans to the position they would have occupied had ERISA
not been violated. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 n.9 (indicating "Congress's in-
tent that actions for breach of fiduciary duty be brought" to assure financial
integrity of plan as a whole); Brock v. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.N.J.
1986) (noting ERISA must be liberally construed in order to carry out its pur-
poses of "protecting the employees' interests and preserving the integrity of
plan assets"). Courts reach different conclusions, however, on the extent of
relief necessary to accomplish this goal. See supra note 121.
132. Punitive damages serve the three related purposes of punishing the
defendant, deterring the defendant from repeating the injurious act, and de-
terring others from repeating the defendant's acts. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 9 (5th ed. 1984). Another pur-
pose associated with punitive damages is to reimburse the plaintiff for dam-
ages not otherwise legally compensable, in order to enforce established norms
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they do not directly relate to replenishing contractually defined
benefits depleted by a fiduciary breach. Punitive damages nec-
essarily go beyond contractually protected benefit rights and
therefore are not critical to restoring plans and plan partici-
pants to the positions they would have occupied but for the
breach of trust. In contrast, imposing liability for plan losses on
nonfiduciaries who assist a fiduciary breach is essential to com-
pensating plans injured by fiduciary violations.133
The Russell decision did not produce gaps in the protection
afforded employee benefit plans under ERISA. As the concur-
ring opinion contended, limiting section 409(a) to plan relief did
not reduce employee protection because section 502(a)(3) al-
ready provides adequate individual recovery for plan partici-
pants.13 4 The "party in interest" theory of liability adopted in
Nieto, however, diminishes employee safeguards under ERISA
by refusing to afford employee benefit plans and their partici-
pants the protection of nonfiduciary liability.
Interpretive questions involving ERISA's fiduciary provi-
sions require courts to look to traditional trust law for gui-
dance.135 The Russell court did not address trust principles in
its examination of section 409(a) because it focused on the de-
gree of authorized damages rather than on whether statutory
standards had been violated. 36 The Nieto court, when faced
with the issue of nonfiduciary liability, misunderstood Russell
as rejecting the incorporation of trust law to develop and ram-
of conduct. Id.; see also Note, ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach of Fiduci-
ary Duty, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743, 755 (1985) (arguing that deterrence is
primary justification for allowing punitive damages under ERISA).
133. See Brock, 635 F. Supp. at 569 (concluding that participants and benefi-
ciaries would not obtain full relief if denied recovery from nonfiduciaries who
knowingly participated in breaches of fiduciary duties).
134. Russell, 473 U.S. at 151 (Brennan, J., concurring). "[S]ince § 502(a)(3)
already provides participants and beneficiaries with 'other appropriate equita-
ble relief ... to redress [ERISA] violations,' there is no reason to construe
§ 409[a] expansively" to afford these individuals relief. Id. at 150.
135. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (stating ERISA's provisions
must be construed in light of the special nature and purposes of employee ben-
efit plans); see also Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 641-42
(W.D. Wis. 1979) (concluding, in light of congressional intent that ERISA
"make applicable the law of trusts," that ERISA empowers federal courts to
award relief available in traditional trust law against nonfiduciaries who
knowingly participate in fiduciary breach of trust).
136. See generally Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (analyzing whether § 409(a) reme-
dies inure to entire plan rather than to individual participants or beneficiaries,
rather than whether actions of plan fiduciaries violated § 409(a)); see also
supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing Russell decision).
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ify ERISA's fiduciary standards.137 This conclusion led the
Ninth Circuit wrongly to reject nonfiduciary liability under
ERISA and to hinder achievement of ERISA's remedial goals.
2. Nieto's Construction of ERISA
Although recovery against a party in interest, like nonfidu-
ciary liability, is not expressly provided for in ERISA, the
Ninth Circuit allowed recovery under section 502(a)(3) against
a party in interest who engages in a prohibited transaction with
a fiduciary. " s The Nieto court held that ERISA's definition of
parties in interest 39 with respect to a plan gives them a "status
defined by the Act" and distinguishes them from
nonfiduciaries. 140 Moreover, ERISA prohibits plan fiduciaries
from engaging in certain transactions with parties in interest.'
4
'
Thus, "party in interest" liability is necessary, according to the
Ninth Circuit, to facilitate redress of prohibited transactions by
enveloping all parties to such actions within the scope of ER-
ISA's remedies. 142
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning behind allowing party in in-
terest liability equally supports permitting recovery against a
nonfiduciary under ERISA. Nonfiduciaries, although not ex-
pressly defined in the Act, also occupy a status under ERISA as
persons with respect to a plan who do not fit within ERISA's
definition of a plan fiduciary.143 ERISA proscribes both fiduci-
137. 845 F.2d at 872 (concluding that § 409(a) provides remedy only against
fiduciaries after noting that Supreme Court's holding in Russell rejects any
remedies not incorporated expressly in ERISA).
138. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
139. ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1982); see also supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
140. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873-74; see also McDougall v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp.
596, 598-99 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (permitting equitable relief under § 502(a)(3)
against party in interest who engages in prohibited transaction; court did not
address nonfiduciary liability).
141. ERISA § 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (1982). The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that because such prohibited transactions are illegal under ERISA,
§ 502(a)(3) empowers federal courts to redress such violations. Nieto, 845 F.2d
at 873; see supra note 53-55 and accompanying text.
142. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 874. The Ninth Circuit noted that § 406(a) prohibits
only certain transactions by fiduciaries and does not specifically bar parties in
interest from engaging in such transactions. Id. Although the Internal Reve-
nue Code provides an explicit penalty for parties in interest who participate in
prohibited transactions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress would not
have left participants without recourse against parties clearly covered by ER-
ISA who violate its provisions. Id at 874 n.6; see also supra note 54 (discussing
taxes imposed on parties in interest who participate in prohibited transaction).
143. ERISA defines a plan fiduciary in § 3(21)(A). ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
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ary involvement in prohibited transactions and commission of
fiduciary breaches.1 44 The Nieto court reasoned that relief
under ERISA against all parties involved in a prohibited trans-
acdon is essential to enforcement of the statute.145 Recovery
against all parties, including nonfiduciaries, who knowingly
participate in a fiduciary breach of duty follows from this inter-
pretation of ERISA1 46 Thus, both the Ninth Circuit's own ra-
tionale and feasible construction of ERISA's remedial
provisions warrant judicial imposition of nonfiduciary liability.
3. Implications of the Nieto decision
By resting liability standards on defined classes of parties
and transactions under ERISA, the Ninth Circuit weakens
rather than reinforces ERISA's remedial provisions. Under the
holding of Nieto, nonfiduciaries who fall outside ERISA's
"party in interest" definition can conspire knowingly with a fi-
duciary without fear of liability under the Act. Nonfiduciaries
therefore can harm a benefit plan, and plan participants as well
as the plan are denied relief.1 47
ERISA is a remedial statute entitled to liberal construction
by the courts.1 48 Nonfiduciary liability for knowing participa-
§ 1002(21)(A) (1982); see supra note 3 and accompanying text. Because ERISA
defines persons, one can make an argument, under the Ninth Circuit's own
reasoning, that ERISA gives persons a status under the Act. ERISA § 3(9) de-
fines a person as any "individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, mu-
tual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization,
association, or employee organization." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(9) (1982).
144. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (regarding proscription
of fiduciary participation in certain transactions); 43, 61, 63 and accompanying
text (regarding language of ERISA that establishes fiduciary duties and pro-
vides for relief from fiduciary breaches).
145. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 874 (acknowledging that courts may be unable to ad-
dress transactions in violation of ERISA unless they have jurisdiction over all
parties who allegedly participated in such violations).
146. Nonfiduciaries often injure employee benefit plans by assisting fiduci-
aries in breaching their obligations under ERISA. See cases cited supra note 7.
To redress such infractions, courts must be able to impose liability on
nonfiduciaries to restore losses to plans harmed by a fiduciary violation. See
cases cited supra note 93.
147. The Ninth Circuit concedes that some actions by plan attorneys may
fall outside the definition of prohibited transactions and thus, under their
"party in interest" approach, be beyond ERISA's remedial provisions. Nieto,
845 F.2d at 874 n.7.
148. See Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1983)
(stating ERISA is remedial statute that should be liberally construed in favor
of employee benefit plan participants); Duchow v. New York Teamsters Pen-
sion Fund, 691 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1982) (recognizing that ERISA is remedial
statute designed to protect plan beneficiaries by reducing risk of losing plan
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tion in a fiduciary violation advances ERISA's remedial pur-
pose. Recovery against a party in interest under section
502(a)(3) is restricted to equitable relief1 49 and therefore does
not ensure full restoration of plan losses resulting from a pro-
hibited transaction.150 Nonfiduciary liability under section
409(a), however, provides both equitable and legal relief to en-
sure that the plan is compensated fully for harm caused by a
fiduciary violation.15 1
The Ninth Circuit's "party in interest" approach imposes li-
ability based simply on a person's defined status and actions
under ERISA. 52 ERISA defines parties in interest to give fidu-
ciaries notice regarding the people with whom they may and
may not deal on the plan's behalf.153 Similarly, ERISA pros-
cribes certain transactions to inform fiduciaries of the limits
placed on their dealings with parties in interest. 5 4 Thus, these
definitions do not serve as useful mechanisms for imposing lia-
bility or compensating injured plans under ERISA.
The Nieto "party in interest" theory, applied literally,
could impose liability on a third person induced by a plan fidu-
ciary unwittingly to participate in a prohibited transaction. In
this situation, placing liability on a party in interest, unaware of
its relation to the plan, is unjust to the third person and de-
tracts from the deterrent force of ERISA's remedial provi-
benefits), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 918 (1983); see also Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54,
65 (1968) (following well-settled principle that courts should liberally construe
remedial statutes to effectuate their purposes); cases cited supra note 70 (rec-
ognizing that courts should construe broadly ERISA's remedial provisions).
149. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 147.
151. See supra note 63.
152. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
153. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong, 2d Sess. 306 & n.2 (recogniz-
ing prohibited transaction rules focus on fiduciary in accordance with tradi-
tional trust law emphasis on self-dealing, and defining prohibited transactions
as same type of transaction that constitutes prohibited self-dealing under com-
mon law), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5087 &
n.2; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (comparing ERISA's treat-
ment of plan fiduciaries and parties in interest who participate in prohibited
transactions).
154. Because plan fiduciaries are liable only if they knew or should have
known that an action consitituted a prohibited transaction, ERISA sets forth
certain actions in which a plan fiduciary may not engage with persons de-
scribed as parties in interest. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 306-07 (stating that fiduciaries are generally prohibited under Title I
from engaging in specified transactions with parties in interest, but refusing to
punish fiduciary when unaware of other party's status as party in interest), re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5087; see supra note 54
and accompanying text.
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sions.155 Courts could enhance compliance with ERISA by
requiring the fiduciary, who knowingly transgressed ERISA's
standards, to provide full equitable and legal relief to the plan.
Nonfiduciary liability complements enforcement of ERISA by
limiting accountability to those persons who knowingly commit
or assist a fiduciary breach of duty.156
C. INCORPORATION OF NONFIDUCIARY LIABILITY
UNDER ERISA
ERISA's enforcement provisions protect the welfare of
plans by restraining fiduciary breaches and providing for resto-
ration of plan losses that such violations cause.157 While deter-
ring variation from ERISA's stringent standards is desirable,
section 409(a) primarily seeks to compensate plans harmed by
fiduciary breaches of duty.158 A fiduciary who violates "any fi-
155. Congress intended to reduce the incentive for plan trustees to act in
their own commercial interest by imposing stricter fiduciary duties under ER-
ISA. Construing ERISA's remedies to allow nonfiduciaries to participate in a
breach of fiduciary obligations without incurring personal liability does not ef-
fectively remove the economic appeal of commercial gain by third persons.
Without imposition of personal liability under ERISA, a nonfiduciary can be
accountable only for profits gained from misuse of plan assets. The temptation
for third persons to participate in a breach thus still exists. Cf Scott, Partici-
pation in a Breach of Trust, 34 HARv. L. REV. 454, 481 (1921) (stating that
trustee or other fiduciary occupies position in which great temptation exists to
pursue personal interests rather than interests of beneficiaries for whom
trustee acts).
Furthermore, because ERISA imposes liability on a fiduciary only for
knowingly engaging in a prohibited transaction with a party in interest, impos-
ing liability on third persons because they fall within ERISA's definition of
parties in interest is inequitable. See supra note 54 (discussing different conse-
quences ERISA imposes on fiduciary and party in interest for participating in
prohibited transaction).
156. Cf. Scott, Participaton in a Breach of Trust, 34 HARV. L. REV. 454, 481
(1921) (recognizing propriety of third person liability for knowingly conspiring
with fiduciary in breach of obligations, but arguing imposition of such liability
without actual knowledge of breach of trust makes it dangerous for third per-
sons to deal with fiduciary and seriously interferes with proper fiduciary
performance).
157. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text (discussing various reme-
dies available under ERISA).
158. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982) (requiring reimburse-
ment of plan losses resulting from breach of fiduciary obligations and restora-
tion of profits from misuse of plan assets, as well as authorizing "other
equitable or remedial relief" as the court deems necessary); see also supra
notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing plan-related relief against fidu-
ciaries under § 409(a); Russell, 473 U.S. at 141-43 & n.9 (stating that ERISA is
primarily concerned with preventing misuse of plan assets and limiting
§ 409(a) to remedies which ensure financial integrity of entire plan rather than
protection of individual participants).
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duciary duty" under section 409(a), knowingly or otherwise,
must place the plan in the position it would have occupied but
for the breach of trust.15 9 In the event a fiduciary is judgment-
proof, nonfiduciary liability becomes instrumental in restoring
plans injured by a fiduciary breach of duty under section 409(a).
Congress designed ERISA to protect employees and their
benefit plans.160 ERISA's strict fiduciary standards and various
remedies effectuate this goal.161 ERISA's stated policy gives
participants "appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access
to the Federal courts. 1 62 Congress directed courts to supple-
ment the language of ERISA by developing a federal common
law to govern disputes under the Act. 63 Thus, Congress did
not intend to limit "appropriate" remedies to those expressly
included in ERISA. Remedies under ERISA should carry out
the purpose for which Congress created the substantive law.
164
When a nonfiduciary participates in a fiduciary breach of trust,
courts must look beyond the statutory text and formulate rem-
edies adequately to compensate plans and participants for their
violated rights.
Congress envisioned judicial formulation of remedies to
achieve comprehensive employee benefit plan protection. In
construing ERISA's protective provisions, Congress instructed
courts to rely on common-law trust principles for guidance. 165
Because Congress intended to increase the protection afforded
employee benefit plans by common law, 66 wholesale adoption
of trust law concepts is inappropriate. Rather, Congress ad-
vised courts to shape trust law to complement the special na-
159. See supra notes 63-65, 131, 158 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 4, 43, 45-49 and accompanying text (describing fiduci-
ary duties ERISA imposes); notes 60-68 and accompanying text (discussing ER-
ISA's remedial provisions).
162. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
163. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; see also cases cited
supra note 93 and accompanying text (acknowledging Congress's intent to fed-
eralize common law of trusts under ERISA).
164. See cases cited supra note 148.
165. See Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th
Cir. 1984) (stating Congress did not intend courts to restrict regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans to terms of ERISA's provisions, but empowered courts to
develop body of federal common law).
166. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing ineffective
pre-ERISA regulation of employee benefit plans that inspired passage of stat-
ute); notes 43, 45-49 and accompanying text (describing fiduciary duties ERISA
imposes and comparing statute with obligations enforced under common law
of trusts).
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ture of employee benefit plans in light of ERISA's remedial
purpose.167 Incorporation of traditional trust principles that en-
hance plan and participant protection is consistent with ER-
ISA's goal and therefore should remain applicable under the
statute. Courts should incorporate nonfiduciary liability for
knowing participation in a fiduciary breach, as recognized
under trust law, 168 to ensure uniform application of ERISA's
standards.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nieto, federal courts
uniformly imposed liability on persons who knowingly assisted
a fiduciary breach of duty under ERISA. 169 The Ninth Circuit
rejected nonfiduciary liability based on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Russell. °7 0 The Supreme Court's holding in Russell,
however, does not require lower federal courts to reduce or di-
minish plan-related recovery expressly authorized by section
409(a). 17 1 In Russell, the Court interpreted ERISA to deny
claims for individual relief under section 409(a).17 2 As the
Court noted, Congress intended ERISA to safeguard partici-
pants' contractually defined benefits under their plans. 7 3 The
Russell opinion did not decide the propriety of punitive dam-
ages under other ERISA remedies, 74 nor preclude recovery by
a plan against a nonfiduciary who joins in a fiduciary breach of
duty.
Courts should afford employee benefit plans and their par-
ticipants comprehensive relief for violations of fiduciary duties
under ERISA. Full recovery from fiduciary breaches is essen-
tial to ensure the financial integrity of plans and to protect the
interests of participants. While ERISA provides extensive re-
covery against a fiduciary who breaches a duty, plans and par-
ticipants may not obtain comprehensive relief unless courts
allow relief from nonfiduciaries who aid such breaches. Nonfi-
duciary liability furthers the remedial goals of ERISA by block-
167. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text (describing Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision).
170. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); see
supra notes 79-85 (discussing Supreme Court's decision).
171. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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ing a potential loophole through which nonfiduciaries could
abuse plan funds. In addition to providing plans with essential
relief under ERISA, nonfiduciary liability for participation in a
breach of fiduciary duty enhances compliance with ERISA's
standards by reducing the incentive for persons knowingly to
assist fiduciary violations.
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